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Many design features have yet to be worked 
out, but modeled on the small coastal com-
batants of foreign navies-here, the Israeli 
Sa'ar 5-class corvette Eilat-Streetfighter 
will give the U.S. Navy new capabilities for 
the inshore battlespace. 
In the November 1999 Proceedings, "Rebalancing the Aeet" introduced the concept of a "streetfighter" as an essential element of the 21st-century U.S. Navy. The 
anicle espouses a force for access into an enemy's de-
fended waters, clearing the way so that our blue-water 
Navy can safely exercise its great power to influence 
events ashore. 
From many quarters a number of apt questions about 
streetfighter have been posed. In what follows I try to an-
swer those that pertain to the foremost task of a street-
fighter: the ability to fight in the "back alleys" of an 
enemy's home waters. 
• You fay streetfighter will facilitate access. What do you 
mean by access? 
Herc, access is the ability to move into the coastal wa-
ters of an enemy, first to deliver air, missile, and gunfire 
attacks, and then to deliver the means of war to the lit-
torals' land side and to sustain Marines, soldiers, Air Force 
air power, and coalition forces fighting on the ground. In 
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a larger sense, it means sea control for a specific littoral 
operation through dominance of local waters. 
• ls streetfighter the foot in the door for a small-ship Navy? 
No streetfighter, even stretched to its limits, could play 
the two primary roles of the blue-water Navy- to secure 
the world's oceans for safe transit and trade among all 
peace-loving states, and to project offensive combat power 
to influence events ashore in peacetime, crisis, or war. The 
streetfighter concept eschews economies of scale that are 
the great strength, advantage, and cornerstone argument 
for large, multipurpose warships. 
• Expound on the statement in the November article 
that the Navy elements to support access will "cost Jess 
than 10% of the ship budget, comprise more than 25% 
of the numbers in the fleet, and suffer most of the losses." 
The streetfighter budget cannot exceed I 0% of the cost 
of Navy ships because streetfighter only fills a niche. It 
is vital one that demands our attention, but the blue-water 
Navy must safeguard the high seas and be free to project 
its influence on the land side of the world's littorals. The 
10% ceiling also applies to the crews for streetfighters. 
but manning them ought to take closer to 5%. 
Aeet numbers of 25% or greater can be arrived ilt by 
estimating the replacement cost of 300 blue-water com-
batants (the Economy A force) at about $1 billion each, 
or $300 billion. Hence, the share for streetfighter con0 struction (the Economy B force) is at most 10%, 0 ~ $3 
billion.• If we price streetfighter at $80 miJlion each in se-
ries production, and buy a flotilla of 100 at 10 per year, 
the total investment is then $8 billion. But unlike blue-
water ships, the streetfighter needs mobile sustainment, 
analogous to the tenders that once serviced diesel sub-
marines. In computing this overhead, we estimate that ten 
$500-million support ships will be needed, totaling $5 bil-
lion. Therefore, the investment in Economy B would be 
$13 billion. If, however, we assign to streetfighters (not 
the support ship's) a 10-year life but amortize Economy A 
ships over 30 years, then the comparative investment to 
maintain Economy B might be more like $29 billion. 
Streetfighters would suffer most of the losses because 
they would be the point of the access sword. These small 
craft would be out in front, so when the contest for 
coastal access is intense, they would see the most intense 
fighting. • The article is silent on aircraft, except to say tltat street-
fighter might carry or be supported by manned, and in 
due course by unmanned, aircraft. Can you amplify? 
One of the first things learned by a task analysis of 
coastal operations is that low-flying aircraft, not big ships 
or submarines, are the alternative to streetfighters. For 
overt reconnaissance, aircraft altitude and speed give them 
a greater sweep rate, but streetfighter's stay time is longer. 
Aircraft can fly on both sides of a coastline, but water-
borne vessels are better for patrolling a station in a choke 
point and off a port or landing site. Surface craft are bet-
ter for escort of slow-moving merchant ships, but air-
craft are superior for speeding to a datum or quick visual 
inspection of radar contacts. A combination of the two is 
superior to either alone for blockade, inspection, and 
seizure. A combination also looks superior for across-the-
beach support of fighting ashore. When subject to attack 
each has its advantages and weaknesses, but one small 
surface combatant carries more offensive ordnance than 
several aircraft. Unit procurement costs are similar, but 
annual operating costs probably would favor streetfighter 
when base support afloat or ashore is factored in. 
• Big ships are comfortable and habitable, and they carry 
weeks of self-sustainment. Streetfighter seems to ltave no 
such qualities. How will a squadron be supported? 
All design considerations for streetfighter should reflect 
plans for support afloat. The smaller model should be sized 
so that a high-speed mother ship can carry six or eight. 
The upper limit is therefore around 300 tons, and the craft 
must be configured to launch and recover in an open sea. 
The crew should be small, so crew endurance probably 
is going to be the limiting factor on mission time. Habit-
ability, sustainment, and replacement crews must reside 
in the mother ship. Aircraft would have to be based in the 
mother ship, too, thus limiting the radius of action of the 
small streetfighter for some tasks. 
Larger versions of, say, 1,200 tons would have to tran-' 
sit under their own power to their operating theaters and 
be followed closely by a tender for support. Not having 
to be carried, the larger versions would enjoy greater flex-
ibility to adapt modem designs for improved sea keeping 
and payload density. A potential convenience is that six 
spare destroyer tenders already exist for their support. On 
the other hand, aircraft carried by 1,200-ton streetfight-
ers would need support by the tender or an accompany-
ing air-capable ship. 
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Whenever operations are near a friendly state, a small, 
prepackaged, transportable shore facility is an alternative. 
• Won't small combatants suffer in foul weather? 
On the contrary, for fighting in coastal "streets and al-
leys," foul weather would be the friend of streetfighter, 
which always would be looking for the cover of night, 
coasts, shoals, fog, or high waves. Modem hull forms can 
attenuate the effects of high sea states, but streetfighter's 
success does not depend on them. A 44-foot yawl in the 
Bermuda Race is no picnic when the wind is blowing 30 
knots, but every ocean sailor knows that a small vessel 
rides the waves when a big one crashes through them. 
• Say more about Streetjighter's stealth properties. 
Low observability seems essential, but assessing the de-
gree of signature reduction across all forms of detection 
and targeting is a plunge into deep waler. The attractive-
ness of a streetfighter with stealth properties is twofold. 
First, it is easiest to reduce the radar cross section, wake, 
infrared signature, and visual detection of a small ship. 
Second, if there is a flock of small ships, each powerfully 
armed yet hard to detect, then the enemy will live in 
continuing fear over whether he has found them all. 
• Since the 1960s modular warships have been an ambi-
tion unfulfilled. Can you reverse this story of failure? 
The Danish Navy seems already to have done so. It is 
more a question of details now. Do we have several plugs 
or one big suite dropped onto a hull? If we think small 
and modular, then we can arrange for a production base 
that is ready 10 roll once the basic hull design is estab-
lished. We should be able to tool up and produce hulls 
of a standard design in just a few months. At the same 
time, we will have flexibility to create affordable new 
module designs. The hull could serve for 20 or 30 years, 
with new modules constructed whenever technology of-
fers significant advances. 
But there are too many free parameters to get a modu-
lar design right on the first try. No systems analyst who 
understands the variations, opportunities, strategic vari-
ables, and need for coordination with Economy A's ele-
ments would claim that analysis will substitute for ex-
perimentation afloat. 
• Don't large, multimission ships such as carriers and 
Aegis cruisers gfve flexibility and more combat power in 
a given hull? 
Yes, that is why we like them. They have more capa-
bility for the cost than small combatants. But they have 
a downside. If a multimission ship is lost (put out of ac-
tion and sent back for repairs) while performing one task 
then it is lost for all other tasks as well. 
In addition, to say that our finest multipurpose ships, 
the Arleigh Burke (DDG-5 l)-class guided-missile de-
stroyers, can be fully capable for strike, air defense, an-
tisubmarine warfare, search and rescue, early warning, air-
craft carrier and amphibious ship protection, operations 
other than war, theater ballistic missile defense, convoy 
escort into a friendly port, or minefield detection and neu-
tralization is to overlook the training demands involved. 
• Great "combat power' is described as a virtue of the 
Economy A component- the blue-water Navy. Can you be 
more specific? 
Combat potential is a technically more accurate term 
for what Economy A forces bring to the scene. Combat 
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The present fleet is heavily committed, overworked, 
and needs relief. Streetfighter apart, at the Navy's 
present building rate we will soon have a 200-ship navy, 
and only half will be less than ten years old. 
potential is the stuff that when delivered on targets is 
combat power that diminishes the enemy's hearts, minds, 
bodies, and machines. In its substantive navy manifesta-
tion, it is deliverable ordnance (shells, missiles, bombs, 
torpedoes, and mines). Another form of combat potential 
could be termed formidability-e.g., manifest bigness, 
obvious speed, devilish appearance, and demonstrated 
cunning. 
Streetfighters carry substantive combat potential and 
deliver combat power in many small bundles. An enemy 
probably also will see deviltry and cunning in a squadron 
of streetfighters. Their image is like a gang of "Billy the 
Kids," runty in stature but lightning fast on the draw. The 
bullets in their six-guns and a killer's reputation are their 
combat potential, to persuade, intimidate, or destroy. 
Economy A ships, the power-projection component of 
the Navy, have great potential because they carry large 
arsenals and are formidable looking. But if an enemy puts 
one of them out of action then its massed potential is never 
transformed into combat power. 
• Are you saying that big warships are too vulnerable? 
Yes and no. One kamikaze sometimes was enough to 
do great damage to (but not to sink) a large aircraft car-
rier. The unpleasant fact is that early antiship cruise mis-
siles were designed with large warheads and kinetic en-
ergy sufficient for one or two hits to put a cruiser or larger 
warship out of action. Data from World War II show 
that the weight of explosives it took to put a warship out 
of action-even those with extensive armor and com-
partmentation-increased only in proportion to the cube 
root of the displacement. It is unlikely that existing large 
warships are less vulnerable. 
On the other hand, it takes about four times more war-
head weight to sink a large warship than to put it out of 
action. During the 1980s' tanker war in the Persian Gulf, 
big.commercial ships often took a missile or mine hit with-
out being stopped. Thus, there is likelihood that a future 
warship of comparable size can be designed and built to 
take several missile hits and sometimes a torpedo or mine 
without being rendered helpless. 
• Surface-to-air missile defense systems such as Aegis 
take space, weight, crewing, and dollars. What kind of de-
fense do you envision/or streetfighters? 
A 300-ton streetfighter would depend on stealth char-
acteristics, soft kill, numbers, and the ability to lose it-
self "in the clutter." It could carry light antiair weapons 
such as Stingers. The design philosophy should be that vi-
sual detection of it will predominate, no present missile 
guidance system will detect and home on it, and added 
safely comes from confronting an enemy with a swarm of 
targets. 
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A larger version of 1,200 tons might carry not only soft 
kill systems but also deployable decoys and Rolling Air-
frame missile (RAM) or the equivalent, while accepting 
that low observability and active defense are conflicting 
characteristics. 
• Are you really willing, then, to let little streetfighters 
be sunk and U.S. sailors die? 
Streetfighters must be designed to lose. If no risk of 
loss is contemplated, then they are a poor design concept, 
because they forego the economies of scale that are a 
prominent advantage of Economy A warships. To limit 
the loss of life, streetfighters should be manned austerely. 
The small version could be crewed in a "cockpit" that dou-
bles as an escape capsule. I would expect that after a mis-
sile hit of Exocet size or larger, the ship would be useless 
and so could be abandoned without regret. 
Large warships of 8,000 to 12,000 tons can be put out 
of action after one or two missile hits, too, yet they are 
too valuable to abandon. Their crews (numbering in the 
hundreds) are subject to funher hits and loss of life while 
containing the damage. The successful investment in dam-
age control in World War II made sense primarily because 
ships as small as destroyers often could keep fighting after 
taking several shell or bomb hits. 
• Why not do a more comprehensive systems analysis to 
refine the design and confirm streetfighter's cost-effec-
tiveness before bending metal into experimental designs? 
No quarrel with conducting systems analyses concur-
rent with the construction of a small experimental squadron 
to gain experience at sea. The danger is that the Navy will 
study the problem to death with ships on paper. Possibil-
ities are almost without limit, and we may never feel sat-
isfied that we have everything right. In addillon, we are 
not talking about an investment of billions of research-
and-development dollars. I venture that we could design 
and build three l ,200-ton streetfighters or eight 300 ton-
ners for much less than a billion dollars. Nor would they 
be designed from scratch. Foreign navies have done much 
of the systems analysis in the course of designing their 
many inshore combatant variants. 
• Why not just borrow some foreign navies• concepts and 
small combatants for experimentation? 
There are significant design opponunities not yet in-
corporated by overseas navies. Perhaps we can profit from 
this rare opportunity to choose wisely from among the 
best features of foreign sma11 combatants. 
More fundamentally, we need small-ship design expe-
rience of our own. For instance, the Navy design models 
for parametric studies of warships lose their applicability 
below around 2,000 tons displacement. Shipyards need 
experience in constructing small combatants, too. 
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• Do you really believe that the roles of the access navy 
and the projection navy are distinct? Won't the street-
fighters coordinate with the blue-water navy? 
Network-based cooperation will help each to cover and 
be covered by the other. Consider a modem enemy coastal 
defense "fleet" consisting of small combatants with heavy 
firepower aided by inconspicuous small craft and sub-
marines to detect and target our projection navy, and sup-
plemented ashore by a complex of sensors, missile sites, 
land-based aircraft, and very long-range artillery. The land 
sites are screened by the small combatants offshore at the 
same time that the land sites cover the forces afloat. Our 
employment is a mirror image of this enemy campaign 
plan, in which the rear echelon is sea based. The blue-
water fleet covers the streetfighters who screen them in 
return. After some fierce fighting, the projection forces 
will have safe access to move in and pound the enemy's 
deeper land-side defenses. 
Composite tactics will be hard to develop, but tech-
nology and tactics must be two sides of a single coin. 
• Can't U.S. Coast Guard cutters perform the street-
fighters' roles? 
In small part, yes. Harbor defense, counterintrusion, and 
counterinftltraiion are accepted Coast Guard tasks. But 
streetfighter must be designed to go up against major sea-
denial capabilities. In addition, the Coast Guard is very 
busy and probably will continue its heavy commitment to 
fighting illegal immigration and smuggling. 
• Do we really need JOO streetfighters now? 
The reason to act now is to build up before we face a 
major sea-denial force. If we start today it will take about 
15 years to deploy 100 streetfighters-up to five years for 
experimentation and time to overcome reluctance in de-
fense, budget, and congressional staffs, ten more years to 
build the force, at ten per year. 
If we possessed those 12 squadrons, each with eight 
streetfighters, today, we could employ them as follows: 
one squadron to replace blockade and inspection forces in 
the Adriatic; two with the Republic of Korea Navy in 
the Yellow Sea; two to replace many of the U.S. Navy 
ships now conducting counterdrug operations in the 
Caribbean; one Mediterranean squadron alternating be-
tween Rota and La Maddalena to supplement the Sixth 
Fleet in peacetime engagement exercises and port visits; 
two tender•based squadrons in the vicinity of the Strait of 
Hormuz, to reconnoiter and exercise what used to be called 
gunboat diplomacy; two tactical development squadrons 
in San Diego, Puget Sound, Little Creek, Annapolis, New-
port, or Guantanamo Bay; and smaller detachments in sup-
port of peacetime engagement, making port visits and con-
ducting joint exercises in places such as the East and South 
China Seas, the Baltic and Black Seas, and the east and 
west coasts of Africa ·1 
• Doesn't streetfighter jeopardize existing warship build-
ing programs: CVX, LPD-17, DD-21, and SSN-21 ? 
How can it be so? The present fleet is heavily com-
mitted, overworked, and needs relief. Streetfighter apart, 
at the Navy's present building rate we will soon have a 
200-ship navy, and only half will be less than ten years 
old. Even The Brookings Institution wouldn't argue that 
we could cancel DD-21 at $800 million and replace it with 
streetfighter at S80 million. 
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The projection navy must stand or fall on its own mer-
its. Economy A and Economy B are complementary com-
ponents of one fleet configured to go wherever it is needed. 
• If streetfighter is a good idea, why has it taken this long 
for recognition? 
Among the rest of the world's navies its virtues are long 
recognized. But streetfighter was irrelevant for the U.S. 
Navy until the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is opera-
tion in coastal waters that concerns us now, and the im-
pending need for safe access as littoral waters become 
more dangerous. 
• What is the unexpressed threat to streetfighter? 
We won't know if there's a downside until we experi-
ment. The biggest danger is that streetfighter will be con-
ceived as a junior variation of the projection navy: the 
same habitability standards, spacious bridge, electronically 
comprehensive combat information center, offices, and 
paperwork; a galley with cooks and mess cooks; defenses 
that are supposed to defeat every attack; stocks for months 
at sea; standard damage-control teams and procedures; and 
a guarantee for each young captain that one grounding 
or failed inspection will send him packing. 
Streetfighter crews must train to operate as a team at 
high speed in shallow waters; to lurk in coves or behind 
islets and against cliffs; to disappear into fishing fleets 
and coastal traffic; to defeat enemy missiles without fir-
ing a shot; to destroy enemy ships, aircraft, and submarines 
by detecting with one unit and vectoring two or three oth-
ers to attack from another direction; to team with aircraft; 
to keep weapons free to fire yet without fratricide; to eat 
meals ready-to-eat (MREs) off hot plates; and to swap 
crews without a ballistic-missile-submarine-like turnover. 
Everyone must know that streetfighter operations will be 
as different from amphibious assault ship operations as 
submarine operations in days of yore were different from 
fighting in a battle line. 
• What is the overlooked upside? 
First, the debate over the designs and accompanying 
tactics will make the projection navy conscious of its vul-
nerability in coastal waters. 
Second, the trend in scouting, tracking, and targeting 
systems will almost surely lead to future networks of 
smaller, more dispersed, more mobile, and better concealed 
sensors and weapons, whether on land, at sea, or in the 
air. Experience now with small combatant tactics and tech-
nology will give us a leg up against exotic threats such as 
space-to-surface missiles, very long range (e.g., one hun-
dred mile) artillery, and very fast (e.g., Mach 7) mis-
siles, each with precision homing. 
Third, although one can hardly sell streetfigh1er for its 
value in affording early command to young officers, that 
is a collateral benefit almost beyond compare. 
Economy B purchases and operates the small vessels (manned and unmanned) 
that provide access, Economy A rcrers lo the blue-water component that exploits 
access by delivering combat power. 
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